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Negotiations to restructure sovereign debt are time consuming, on average taking more
than six years to complete. Such delays are puzzling because they are costly to all parties:
Sovereign debtors in default face disruption in their access to world capital markets, while
creditors suﬀer large losses in the value of their investments. Why are delays so long? In
this paper, we develop a theory of sovereign debt restructuring negotiations based on the
observation that it takes place in a weak contractual environment, where the sovereign cannot
commit to making identical settlement oﬀers to all creditors. Delay then arises endogenously
due to a strategic holdout eﬀect whereby creditors delay entering into a settlement in the
expectation of better terms at a later date.
Motivated by a number of recent cases and the ensuing policy debate,1 we use the theory
to examine whether strategic holdout is overcome by collective action mechanisms, i.e. policies
which bind holdout creditors to agreements negotiated by a group of earlier settling creditors.
Our most striking result is that collective action mechanisms can actually increase delay due
to an oﬀsetting free-rider eﬀect in which creditors free-ride on the negotiation eﬀorts of other
creditors. In a calibrated version of the model, we show that collective action mechanisms can
more than double delay for an empirically signiﬁcant subset of restructurings.
To understand the mechanism underlying our theory, note that the legal environment
in which creditors settle with sovereigns in default gives each individual creditor the power to
disrupt a sovereign’s access to world capital markets. As the sovereign is unable to commit, a
settlement paid to a creditor is sunk and does not inﬂuence the terms of future negotiations.
These features lead to the strategic holdup eﬀect by giving individual creditors an incentive to
delay entering into negotiations in the hope of exploiting their power to disrupt market access
later in the restructuring process and extract a higher settlement. Strategic holdup is captured
by the Individual Settlement application of our model, where creditors play a dynamic timing
game in which they decide both when to enter into negotiations with a sovereign as well as
how to bargain with the sovereign. In addition to establishing the existence of delay, we derive
a number of comparative dynamics results. Consistent with the concerns of policy-makers, we
1For example, compare the position of the US Treasury (Taylor 2002, 2007) with that of the International
Monetary Fund (Krueger 2001, 2002a,b)show that if markets become more fragmented by a rise in the number of creditors, competition
to be the last to settle intensiﬁes, and delay is increased.
Recent policy proposals have been aimed at ensuring equal repayment of creditor claims.
Such ‘collective action mechanisms’ include both the proposed re-introduction of bondholder
councils (which enforced equal repayment during the earlier era of bond lending), and the
introduction of collective action clauses into bond contracts, which have recently become the
norm under New York law. These policies are captured by our analysis of the Collective
Settlement application of our model. We show that collective action mechanisms can increase
delay because the imposition of common settlement terms intensiﬁes the incentive for creditors
to free ride on the costs of negotiation borne by earlier settling creditors, even though the
incentive to engage in strategic holdout is eliminated.
We then calibrate the model in order to assess the quantitative magnitude of the strate-
gic holdout and free rider eﬀects. For plausible estimates of creditor bargaining power, the
strategic holdout incentive can produce delays of six or more years, in line with the data. We
document a wide range of bargaining costs across diﬀerent debt restructuring episodes and
show that, when the model is calibrated to the range of negotiation costs observed in practice,
the free riding incentive is quantitatively relevant. For complicated restructuring operations,
where the costs of collective negotiation are high, we ﬁnd the introduction of a collective action
mechanism can result in a doubling of delay. For simpler restructuring operations, where costs
are low, we ﬁnd that collective mechanisms will reduce delay by more than 60%.
Our main contribution to the literature on sovereign debt restructuring is the introduc-
tion of a fully speciﬁed extensive form dynamic model of entry and settlement in which delays
arise due to collective action problems among creditors. Our calibration of the model is novel
both in terms of the data used as well as the underlying game. Our theory contrasts with
models of delay in bargaining between a sovereign and a single creditor (Yue 2006, Bi 2007,
and Benjamin and Wright 2008), and models of collective action problems among credi-
tors that do not produce delay (Kletzer 2002, Haldane et al 2003, Weinschelbaum
and Wynne 2005, and Wright 2001 and 2005). Our study of the ease of restructuring
complements Bolton and Jeanne’s (2007) analysis of the decision of a sovereign to issue
debt that is exogenously ‘easy’ or ‘hard’ to restructure. Although many policy makers advo-
2cate a reduction in delay or normative grounds, we caution that we cannot draw normative
conclusions without also studying its eﬀect on ex-ante incentives to borrow appropriately and
avoid default (see instead Benjamin and Wright 2008, Pitchford and Wright 2008
and, in corporate ﬁnance, Bolton and Scharfstein 1996).
Delay in our model stems from a lack of commitment, unlike much of the theoretical
literature on delay in bargaining which stresses private information (See Grossman and
Perry 1986, Fudenburg, Levine and Tirole 1985, and Bai and Zhang 2008 among
others). Our theory is closer in spirit to the literature on timing games, such as the war of
attrition, in which delay occurs due to a sequence of payoﬀs which exogenously increases as
the number of players who remain in the game falls (e.g. Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson
1988, Haig and Cannings 1989, Bulow and Klemperer 1999 and Kapur 1995). By
contrast, our theory of bargaining in a weak contractual environment where past bargains
are sunk generates a rising sequence of payoﬀs endogenously, as in the simple discrete time
two-player model in Menezes and Pitchford (2004). Finally, our theory departs from the
literature on multi-plaintiﬀ settlement (e.g. Spier 1992, 2003a,b and 2007, and Daughety
and Reinganum 2003 and 2005) by assuming a weak contractual environment, which also
rules out the ingenious “divide and conquer” solution to the holdout problem devised by Che
and Spier (2008).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After some background on the institutions
governing sovereign debt restructuring in section 2, section 3 presents our theory. In section 4,
we characterize equilibria under both individual and collective settlement mechanisms for an
arbitrary number of symmetric creditors, establish our main qualitative results about delay, and
present results for a calibrated version of the model. Section 5 then establishes the robustness
of our results to a number of alternative assumptions on the way bargaining is carried out, the
ability of sovereigns to inﬂuence the restructuring process, and to various forms of asymmetry
amongst creditors. Section 6 concludes while an appendix collects proofs of main results, and
an ancillary appendix provides further details on the calibration, and on the extensions and
robustness exercises.
32 Background
Sovereign debt negotiations take place in a “weak contractual environment” which we
characterize by the ﬁve following features. The ﬁrst is fundamental to the problem of sovereign
default:
(I) Sovereigns lack the ability to commit to contracts.
The absence of an international bankruptcy court, combined with immunity from legal
action in their own (and other countries’) jurisdictions—due to the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity—meant that sovereigns could not be bound by contracts they signed. The passage
of legislation like the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976—which allowed lawsuits against
sovereigns in the United States—has weakened this doctrine, but it remains very diﬃcult for
creditors to collect on favorable judgments even when assets are outside a nation’s borders. A
spectacular example is of the Swiss trading ﬁrm Noga’s many failed attempts to seize Russian
assets as various as sailing ships, jet ﬁghter planes, uranium shipments, embassy bank accounts
and art exhibits.2
The sovereign’s inability to commit means that it cannot bind itself to settle on the same
or inferior terms with holdout creditors. In a prominent example of the inability to commit,
Argentina ﬁled documents with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 2004 stating
that it would not pay holdout creditors, and passed domestic legislation prohibiting the re-
opening of the exchange oﬀer (the so-called “Padlock Law”) only to make a new exchange oﬀer
in 2010.3 Of the many examples in which holdout creditors have secured better settlement
terms, the most well known are Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion and The
Republic of Peru,4 where the holdout creditor Elliott Associates received a 58m settlement on
2See “Pride of Russia’s navy set to remain in the dock” Financial Times, 22nd July 2000, p.8 (sailing
ship), “Russian ﬁghters dodge Swiss creditors” Financial Times, 23rd July 2002, p.8 (jet ﬁghters), “Clinton
Issues Executive Order to Protect HEU Assets from Lawsuits” Nuclear Fuel, 26th June, 2000, p.16 (uranium
shipments), “French court set to rule on frozen Russian funds” Financial Times 7th August 2000, p.3 (embassy
bank accounts), “Paintings Returned to Russia” New York Times, 24th November 2005, p.2 (art exhibits), and
the survey in Wright (2001).
3See Schedule B Registration Statement of the Republic of Argentina ﬁled with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission July 2, 2004, and “Argentina Plans To Launch Debt Swap Within 15 Days-Economy
Min”, Wall Street Journal Online, March 22, 2010.
4Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion and The Republic of Peru, 194 F.3d (2d Cir. 1999). See
Alfaro (2006) for a summary.
4bonds with a face value of 21m that it had purchased for 11m, Elliott v. Republic of Panama
(1997),5 where they received roughly twice the settlement, and CIBC Bank (Kenneth Dart) v.
Brazil (1995).6
These successes are the primary motivation for creditor holdout. The reason holdouts
are able to secure larger settlements is due to a second feature of this environment:
(II) All creditors must settle before the sovereign can regain normal credit market access.
Historically, the London Stock Exchange refused to list a sovereign’s new money bonds
until it had settled with all creditors. This is reﬂected in an absence of borrowing by defaulting
countries in the historical record (Tomz (2007). Since the passage of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act, a variety of newer legal tactics have been used to disrupt credit market access.
The most famous was used in the case of Elliott Associates and Peru, discussed above, where
Elliott Associates obtained restraining orders to stop Peru’s bankers releasing funds to pay
interest on Brady bonds issued as part of its restructuring. This brought Peru to the brink of
default on these new bonds and forced a settlement. More importantly, this tactic makes it
impossible for a sovereign to make payments on any new bonds issued while holdout creditors
remain, and thus impossible to issue new bonds. Such lawsuits have become increasingly
common: The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2007), report forty-
seven court cases against a total of eleven highly indebted poor countries, while Argentina was
faced with over one hundred lawsuits following its 2001 default (Gelpern 2005).7
A sovereign’s inability to commit to discriminate against holdout creditors, combined
with its need to settle with every creditor, rules out the “divide and conquer” strategies studied
by Che and Spier (2008). However, the sovereign is able to discriminate in favor of holdout
creditors because:
(III) A settlement exchanges defaulted debt for an immediate cash payment (or its equivalent)
and expunges any future legal rights on the defaulted debt.
5Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Panama, 975 F. Supp. 332 (District, 1997).
6CIBC Bank and Trust Co (Cayman) Ltd v. Banco Central do Brazil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
7See Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2004) and Richmond and Dias (2007) for a debate on the ease
of capital market reaccess in the late 1990s.
5Sovereign debt is typically restructured through an ‘exchange oﬀer’ in which the old
debt is exchanged for some combination of cash and some new securities, as in Peru’s 1993
restructuring which included about 4bn in cash payment and new debt with a face value of 4bn
(and market value of about 2bn as its cash equivalent). It might, at ﬁrst, seem contradictory
that a sovereign in default has access to cash. Whereas bankrupt domestic corporations have
limited liquid assets, sovereigns typically have suﬃcient wealth to repay, but choose not to.
In some cases, countries have used their resources to secretly buy back their defaulted debt
on secondary markets. For example, in the 1980s Mexico re-purchased $8bn (Cohen and
Verdier 1995) and Peru repurchased $1.7bn (Alfaro 2006), while Ecuador is alleged to
have recently engaged in secret buybacks (Miller 2009, Porzecanski 2010).
The fact that creditors who settle early with the sovereign give up their old securities
means they do not have access to legal mechanisms to prevent the sovereign paying higher
settlements to holdout creditors later in the process.
In addition to avoiding creditor holdout, another motivation for improving creditor
coordination is to share the costs of arranging settlement:
(IV) Creditors incur substantial transactions costs, some of which are diﬃcult to verify.
The evidence on negotiation costs shows that they vary substantially from one restruc-
turing to the next, are often very large, and are hard to verify and share amongst creditors. We
defer a detailed discussion of the evidence to the calibration section 4.C below (with more de-
tails in the ancillary appendix) and simply note that some banks have declined to participate
in negotiations due to their costs,8 while holdout creditors like Elliott Associated routinely
complain about other holdout creditors who free-ride on the substantial cost of litigation.9
The above features of the environment indicate that creditors may ﬁnd it desirable, but
very diﬃcult, to coordinate. This is borne out by the evidence:
(V) Creditor eﬀorts to coordinate have been frequent, but often ineﬀective.
8The Bank of New York was unwilling to act as agent in Argentina’s 2004 restructuring due to the “size and
complexity” of the deal (“Pre-match betting against Argentina” Financial Times, January 10, 2005). Devlin
(1989, p.200) reports that some small banks wrote oﬀ their claims “in face of unwanted costly and protracted
negotiations.”
9“Elliott’s activist chief has no time for cheats”, Financial Times, 10th April 2006, p.4.
6Following the defaults of the early 19th Century, bondholders in London organized
themselves into competing ad hoc bondholder committees (see Esteves 2007 for a review).
That is, debt renegotiation involved competing bondholder committees—if not competing indi-
vidual creditors. We refer to restructuring in such an environment as an Individual Settlement
Process. In response to this competition, the Council (later Corporation) of Foreign Bond-
holders was established in 1868 to represent all British bondholders. The Corporation’s power
derived largely from the fact that the London Stock Exchange deferred to it when deciding
whether to list new bond issues. We refer to restructuring under such a regime as a Collective
Settlement Process. This process is similar to that undertaken by Bank Advisory Committees
which organize collective negotiations to restructure commercial bank loans.
The resurgence in sovereign bond issues has led to a return to an individual settlement
process with ad hoc bondholder committees such as the Global Committee of Argentina Bond-
holders (GCAB). This has prompted a policy debate advocating diﬀerent forms of collective set-
tlement processes for bondholders, ranging from an international bankruptcy court (Krueger
2002a,b) to more modest changes in bond contracts (Taylor 2002, 2007). Sovereign bond
issues under New York law now include engagement and collective action clauses specifying the
procedures by which creditors organize and negotiate with the sovereign, and impose common
settlement terms on other creditors.
3 Model
In this section, we present our basic model, emphasizing how it captures the features
described in section 2. For simplicity we assume that all creditors are symmetric, and adopt a
very simple bargaining protocol. Both of these assumptions are relaxed in Section 5.
3.A Environment
There are N creditors and a sovereign. All players have complete information, are risk
neutral, and have a common discount rate r. The game begins at time t = tN = 0, after
the sovereign defaults on its debt, and does not end until the sovereign has settled with all
creditors. Then, the sovereign is able to re-access world capital markets and gain V , the surplus












Figure 1: The Negotiation Game
The structure of the game is presented in Figure 1. At the beginning, the sovereign is
in default with each of its N creditors. The creditors are anonymous, so the sovereign must
wait for one of them to enter the settlement process. In this initial timing stage, which we
denote TN, each of the N creditors chooses some t ∈ [0,∞) at which to enter the settlement
stage, which we denote by SN (and which we describe in detail below). We assume that only
one creditor can enter a settlement stage at a time, and that ties are resolved by a random
allocation with equal probabilities. Following receipt of a settlement, the creditor exits the
game at t = tN−1, forfeiting any future claims (feature III). The remaining N − 1 creditors
decide when to enter the settlement process in timing stage TN−1 on [tN−1,∞) which ends
when a creditor enters settlement stage SN−1. The creditor exits the game following receipt of
its settlement at some tN−2. Timing and settlement stages are repeated until the last creditor
exits.
Creditors who exit the game have no further claims and hence no further inﬂuence on
outcomes. Thus, we adopt notation to keep track of the number of active players in the game
at any particular point. Subgame i starts with a timing stage Ti where i creditors remain,
followed by a settlement stage Si in which one of them has entered. Subgame i−1 begins once
that creditor exits and there are i−1 creditors remaining, etc. We let Ui denote the payoﬀ to
the creditor, and Vi denote the payoﬀ to the sovereign, at the start of subgame i. Lowercase
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t = ti t = ti−1
Start of subgame i
Creditor: Ui
Sovereign: Vi
Start of subgame i − 1
Creditor: ui
Sovereign: vi
Figure 2: Payoﬀs in Stage i
variables ui and vi denote the payoﬀs as at the end of settlement stage Si, as illustrated in
Figure 2.
A settlement process is a description of how ui and vi are determined in the sequence
of stages Si. We consider two types of process, individual and collective. Under the individual
process, a creditor who enters any Si immediately engages the sovereign in a bilateral bargain
that continues until an agreement is reached. Bargaining entails that the creditor individually
bears a proportional transactions cost, φi (feature IV). The individual process models the
uncoordinated bargaining that has been typically observed in modern times.
The collective process requires a critical number M < N of creditors to agree to a
settlement payment, which then is binding on all remaining creditors. We equate entry to their
respective settlement stages by the ﬁrst M − 1 creditors, as a decision to join the collective
and agree to pay a share of joint transactions costs. In return, the ﬁrst creditor to enter (the
lead creditor) bargains with the sovereign as a representative of all M creditors who joined the
collective. Following practice, the remaining N −M creditors obtain the same settlement (see
feature V). These remaining creditors have the advantage of not having to join the collective,
therefore avoiding an obligation to share in the costs of negotiating the settlement.
Regardless of whether the settlement process is individual or collective, we assume that
all negotiation follows a random-oﬀers variant of the Rubinstein (1981) bargaining game. As
depicted in Figure 3, at the start of each round, Nature randomly selects whether the creditor
















Figure 3: Bargaining Protocol
so that 1 − α is the probability that the sovereign is chosen to make an oﬀer in any given
round. The other party then accepts or rejects the oﬀer. Acceptance ends the bargain with
the creditor exiting the game. Rejection leads to a delay of ∆ units of time. This is followed
by another round of bargaining where the proposer is again selected randomly. The process
continues until an oﬀer is accepted.
In the game with individual settlement, a creditor and the sovereign bargain according
to the random-oﬀers protocol every time a creditor enters a settlement stage. In the game with
the collective process, bargaining happens only once, via a representative, in stage SN−(M−1),
when the critical number M of creditors is reached. Before this number is attained, the payoﬀs
received in Si are those which the entering creditor correctly anticipates will be obtained via
the representative’s bargain with the sovereign, less transactions costs.
It is convenient to deﬁne δi as the expected discount factor—equivalently the expected
cost of delay—for subgame i: That is, δi values one dollar received at the end of the game,
in expected dollars received at time ti. We let βi denote the expected discount factor for the
duration of Ti and Si, that is, the time between the start of subgame i and when the creditor
who enters in Ti, exits settlement Si. Clearly, δi = Πi
j=1βj.
103.B Solution
We solve the game via backwards induction. In any arbitrary stage i, we ﬁrst solve
settlement stage Si which begins after one creditor has entered, and in which payments are
determined by bargaining between the sovereign and the last creditor (individual settlement)
or have been ﬁxed by earlier representative bargaining (collective settlement). Moving back
in the tree, we then solve timing stage Ti to determine which of the i creditors enters the
settlement process to bargain with the sovereign. Alternating back through settlement and
timing stages in this way, we characterize a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the full game that
is Markov in the number of active players in the game. Note that our analysis is simpliﬁed
by the Rubinstein (1981) assumption that bargaining does not end until an agreement is
reached. This means that in settlement stage Si the creditor cannot return to timing stage Ti,
and allows us to separate the solution of settlement stage i from the solution of timing stage i
(we establish robustness to non-separable bargaining protocols in Section 5 below).
We characterize the solution to the full game by two lemmas which describe outcomes
in the separate settlement and timing stages. The bargaining lemma 1 speciﬁes bargaining
outcomes in some settlement stage Sj. It takes as given the bargaining ‘pie’ which is the
sovereign’s value Vj−1 measured as at the beginning of the following timing stage. The entry
lemma, lemma 2, details the outcome of timing stage Ti taking as given the payoﬀs given by
the bargaining lemma for the following settlement stage Si.
We ﬁrst present the bargaining lemma. Note that under individual settlement, each
creditor bargains for itself. Under collective settlement, a creditor bargains on behalf of all of
the N creditors in the ﬁnal settlement stage before the sovereign re-enters world capital mar-
kets. Otherwise, the bargaining game is identical for both individual and collective processes.
Lemma 1 (Bargaining). The unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ from any bargaining
stage j is
αVj−1 (1)




11for all N creditors under collective settlement. In both cases the equilibrium payoﬀ for the
sovereign is
(1 − α)Vj−1 (3)
and bargaining payoﬀs are realized without delay.
Proof. See the appendix section 7.A
Note that the probability α with which Nature chooses a creditor to make an oﬀer in any
round determines the expected bargaining shares (1) for the creditor and (3) for the sovereign.
The lemma presents payoﬀs gross of transactions costs. The payoﬀ uj to the creditor as at the
time of agreement and settlement, is reduced by a factor that we denote as θj ≡ 1 − φj, due
to proportional transaction costs φj.
In the entry lemma below, we study the solution of the arbitrary timing stage in which
i creditors make their entry decisions. The ﬁrst creditor to enter obtains ui which we take as
given from bargaining in the next settlement stage, as characterized in the bargaining lemma
above. All creditors who enter after the ﬁrst receive the continuation value of the game, i.e.
the payoﬀ Ui−1 valued as at the beginning of timing stage i − 1.
In the entry lemma, we derive the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the timing
game. There are also pure strategy equilibria that are necessarily asymmetric, in which players
coordinate on the order of entry. We justify the focus on mixed strategies on the grounds that
sovereign default is uncommon and creditors are often anonymous, so that social norms for
coordinating on pure-strategy equilibria are unlikely to arise. Alternatively, our focus on mixed
strategy equilibria can be justiﬁed due to (small) uncertainty creditors have regarding others’
payoﬀs as in Harsanyi (1973).
Lemma 2 (Entry). The unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of timing stage i is in
mixed strategies. The expected payoﬀ as at the beginning of timing stage i is Ui = ui, where all
creditors randomize according to cdf
Fi = 1 − exp{−λit}, (4)
12the hazard rate is
λi =
rui
(i − 1)[Ui−1 − ui]
, (5)
the expected duration of the stage is









and the expected discount factor is
βi =
iui
(i − 1)Ui−1 + ui
. (7)
Proof. See the appendix section 7.B
The lemma treats Ti as if it were a self-contained timing game with i creditors in which
the ﬁrst to enter receives payoﬀ ui, and the remaining i − 1 players receive payoﬀ Ui−1. In
focusing on symmetric mixed strategies, each player chooses a cdf Fi over the set of feasible
entry times [ti,∞), taking others’ such strategies as given.
A heuristic intuition for the equilibrium cdf (4) is as follows. Consider a particular
creditor, and suppose each other creditor randomizes according to Fi. Our creditor can enter
immediately and receive ui immediately, or delay by a small interval of time ∆t and face a
gamble where ui or Ui−1 could be received: Payoﬀ Ui−1 is obtained if another creditor happens
to enter within the interval. If λi is the hazard rate governing one creditor’s decision to enter,
the hazard that one of i−1 creditors will enter in ∆t is given by (i − 1)λi∆t. In equilibrium,
each creditor must be indiﬀerent between the interest foregone over the unit interval, rui∆t
and the gamble that some other creditor may enter ﬁrst, yielding expected gain Ui−1−ui. This
indiﬀerence implies that
rui∆t = [Ui−1 − ui](i − 1)λi∆t,
which is equivalent to (6) and consistent with the equilibrium cdf (4). The expected discount
factor βi in (7) can easily be found by calculating E[ert].
A crucial insight from this lemma is that the expected payoﬀ Ui of the game at the start
of stage i, is simply ui, the payoﬀ from immediate entry. This is because the creditors delay
13entering until any gains from delay have been eroded in expected value. When considering the
solution to the individual and collective variants of the full game below, this will allow us to
replace payoﬀs Uj in future timing and settlement stages by the payoﬀs uj.
In the next two subsections, we proceed by alternating between lemma 1 to ﬁnd payoﬀs
and lemma 2 to ﬁnd delay and expected discount factors, in order to solve the full game under
both individual and collective settlement processes.
3.C Individual Settlement
Proposition 3. If transactions costs satisfy (1 − α)θi < θi−1, then the game with individual
settlement has a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium with immediate entry in subgame
i = 1 and positive expected delay in stages i > 1 of







−k θi−k − iθi
#
. (8)
Further, expected payoﬀs at the start of subgame i are
Ui = ui = δi−1α(1 − α)
i−1 V θi, (9)
for the creditor and
Vi = βivi = δi (1 − α)
i V (10)
for the sovereign, where δj = Π
j
k=1βk and








, k ≥ 1. (11)
Proof. See the appendix section 7.C.
Here we present the intuition behind the equilibrium payoﬀs (9) and (10) since direct
substitution of these payoﬀs yields expected delay and discount factors. Under individual
settlement, entry leads to a settlement stage in which the entering creditor and sovereign
bargain. We proceed by backwards induction. Consider subgame i = 1 and, in particular, the
14bargain between the last creditor and the sovereign in settlement stage S1. Since the sovereign
receives V on re-entering world capital markets, this amount constitutes the bargaining pie.
From equation (1) in the bargaining lemma, the creditor therefore receives
u1 = αV θ1, (12)
which is share α of the pie less transactions costs θ1. The sovereign receives
v1 = (1 − α)V, (13)
(see (9) and (10) respectively, for i = 1). Moving back to the timing stage T1, with one
remaining creditor, note that because there are no competing creditors, entry is immediate, so
that E [t1 − t0] = 0 and β1 = 1.
Now consider S2. In the bargain between the second-to-last creditor to enter and the
sovereign, both of these parties anticipate that the total available surplus will be reduced
because of the future bargain with the last creditor. In particular, the total bargaining pie
is reduced to V1 = (1 − α)V in anticipation of the ﬁnal settlement where the sovereign pays
the last creditor αV . To solve the bargain in S2, we utilize the bargaining lemma again. The
second-to-last creditor obtains a fraction α of the available pie V1, which yields
u2 = α(1 − α)V θ2 (14)
after transactions costs. The sovereign receives fraction (1 − α) of V1, or v2 = (1 − α)
2 V.
Moving back to the timing stage T2, note that each creditor would prefer the payoﬀ U1 = u1
from being last, to the lower payoﬀ u2 from immediate entry. This leads to a timing game with
positive expected delay: the corresponding expected discount factor is found by substituting
u1 from (12) and u2 from (14) into equation (7) of lemma 2, noting that U1 = u1, i.e.
β2 =
2(1 − α)θ2
θ1 + (1 − α)θ2
(15)
as in (11) of proposition 3 for k = 2. Similarly, expected entry delay can be determined
15using lemma 2, equation (6) as E [t2 − t1] = (θ1 − (1 − α)θ2)/2r(1 − α)θ2. The value of the
sovereign’s payoﬀ at the beginning of subgame i = 2 anticipates the entry delay in the timing
game between the two creditors, and is therefore
V2 = β2 (1 − α)
2 V (16)
as in (10). In S3, third-to-last creditor and sovereign bargain over V2, which determines u3 and
hence β3. Proceeding in this way, we can obtain the formulae for an arbitrary subgame i in
the proposition.
3.D Collective Settlement
The key diﬀerence between the collective and individual settlement processes is that
in the collective case, bargaining does not take place every time a creditor enters some Si.
Instead, creditors play a timing game of entry to a coalition which subsequently bargains with
the sovereign via a representative. Bargaining only occurs when the Mth creditor has entered
the coalition in stage SN−(M−1).10 Before this, entry into settlement stages is taken as an
agreement to be bound by the outcome of the future bargain, and to a share of transactions
costs. For example, consider a game with N = 3 creditors in total and M = 2 creditors
required for collective settlement. The last creditor does not need to bargain and instead
receives the payoﬀ negotiated by the representative in the previous stage, without having to
pay transactions costs. Bargaining only occurs when the second creditor enters stage S2, and
the deal which is struck is imposed on all creditors. Moving back, the ﬁrst creditor joins the
coalition of two by entering S3, and committing to the payoﬀ which will be negotiated with the
sovereign subsequently, less transactions costs share φ3. The following proposition summarizes
the outcome for the general case.
Proposition 4. If transactions costs satisfy θi−1 ≥ θi for i > N − M, then the game with
collective settlement has a unique Markov perfect equilibrium with immediate entry in subgames
i = N − M,...,1 and positive expected delay in stages i > N − M of
10The coalition is ‘complete’ when a total of M creditors have joined it. The timing stage with i = N −M +1
remaining creditors is the one that determines the last to join the coalition and enter settlement stage SN−M+1




N − M +
i−1 X
k=N−(M−1)
θk − (i − 1)(1 − α)θi

. (17)
Further, payoﬀs as at the start of subgame i are
Ui = ui =

   
   
δi−1
α
NV θi if i > N − M
δi−1
α
NV if i ≤ N − M
, (18)
for the creditors and
Vi = βivi = δi (1 − α)V , (19)
for the sovereign, where δi = Πi
j=1βj where the expected discount factors are
βi = iθi





, i > N − M. (20)
Proof. See the appendix section 7.D.
The key to understanding the collective settlement process is to understand the payoﬀs
that emerge in the bargain between the representative and sovereign. Suppose the represen-
tative Mth creditor has entered and the lead creditor proceeds to bargain. As before, the
total surplus over which the parties negotiate is V , being the amount the sovereign gets from
re-access to world capital markets. In contrast to the individual settlement case, the represen-
tative bargains to determine joint surplus for all creditors, and this is divided N ways.11 The
creditors as a group therefore receive αV in expectation and the sovereign receives (1 − α)V .
Thus, each individual creditor receives αV/N gross of transactions costs. The diﬀerence be-
tween those who joined the coalition and those who did not is that only coalition members
pay transactions costs. Thus, each of the M members of the coalition receives α(V/N)θj and
the other N − M creditors (who did not join) obtain αV/N. Equation (18) represents the
11There are two ways in which bargaining by the representative can be viewed. The alternative to the text
is that any settlement which the representative negotiates for itself is also given to N − 1 others. We analyze
this approach and prove equivalence of the two approaches in the ancillary appendix.
17value of these payoﬀs measured as at the beginning of subgame i, i.e. discounted with by
δi−1. Equation (19) is the value of the sovereign’s payoﬀ at the start of subgame i, which is
discounted by δi.
Expected delay and discount factors are calculated by substitution of payoﬀs in lemma 2.
Consider again the example with N = 3 creditors, where M = 2 must agree on a settlement—
join the coalition—before the game ends. Proceeding by backwards induction, suppose we
are at the start of subgame i = 1. The remaining creditor automatically receives α(V/3)
at this point, the settlement having been agreed by the collective action. Thus, there is no
delay in this subgame and β1 = 1. Moving back to the settlement stage of subgame i = 2,
the representative’s bargain yields (current value) α(V/3)θ2 for itself, α(V/3)θ3 for the ﬁrst
creditor to join and α(V/3) for the creditor who does not join. Moving further back to the
timing stage of subgame i = 2, the remaining creditors prefer to receive u1 = α(V/3) rather
than u2 = α(V/3)θ2, which generates positive delay in expectation. Substitution of these
values into equation (7) of lemma 2 yields β2 = 2θ2/(1 + θ2) Entry delay is found using lemma
2, equation (8) as E [t2 − t1] = (1 − θ2)/2rθ2. The sovereign’s value as at the beginning of
subgame 2 is V2 = β2 (1 − α)V.
At the beginning of the game there are i = 3 creditors. The ﬁrst to enter S3 is the
ﬁrst party to join the coalition. Its payoﬀ is u3 = β2α(V/3)θ3 in current value terms. The
remaining creditors receive the larger payoﬀ u2 = α(V/3)θ2. Thus, there is positive expected
delay as each of the three competitors compete to avoid being the ﬁrst to enter. Generally,
there is positive expected delay in each stage up until the representative’s bargain.
4 Results
4.A Strategic Holdup and Free Rider Eﬀects
One of our key ﬁndings is that there is delay under both the individual and the collective
settlement regimes. At a basic level, delay occurs with both settlement processes because
payoﬀs looking forward are rising under both processes. The reason why this is true, however,
is qualitatively diﬀerent between the individual and collective regimes. The diﬀerence is seen
most clearly for the case where all transactions cost terms are the same and equal to θ.
In this case, all delay under individual settlement is due to what we term the strategic
18holdout eﬀect. To understand this terminology, consider equation (10), which gives us the
sovereign’s payoﬀ at the start of subgame i − 1 as Vi−1 = δi−1 (1 − α)
i−1 V . This quantity is
the pie over which creditor and sovereign bargain in prior stage Si. Note that the undiscounted
surplus (1 − α)
i−1 V rises as i falls when we move to later settlement stages. This happens
because prior settlements are sunk and so are not subtracted from the ‘ﬁnal’ pie V . By (9)
a creditor’s payoﬀ is ui = δi−1αθ(1 − α)
i−1 V in subgame i and ui−1 = δi−2αθ(1 − α)
i−2 V in
subgame i − 1. Strategic holdout occurs when a creditor delays in order to obtain the share α
of a larger pie tomorrow (1 − α)
i−2 V rather than a share α of a smaller pie today (1 − α)
i−1 V .
Under collective settlement, the strategic holdout motive is completely absent, regard-
less of transactions costs. This is because each creditor receives the same payoﬀ gross of
transactions costs. The motive for delay in this case is due purely to the free rider eﬀect: the
desire to avoid the transactions costs that are incurred in joining the collective. From (18),
the payoﬀ measured when the representative has bargained is (α/N)V θ for those who join the
coalition and (α/N)V for those who free-ride. Creditors delay entry in subgames i > N − M
so as to avoid the costs θ.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. (Motives for Delay under Individual and Collective Settlement) If transactions
costs are uniform, delay under individual settlement is due purely to the strategic holdout
motive. Regardless of transactions costs, delay under collective settlement is due to the free
rider motive.
It is possible that the free-rider motive outweighs the strategic holdout motive for delay,
and that the introduction of a collective action mechanism actually increases delay. This is
made evident by comparing βj from (11) under individual settlement, with those from (20)
with collective settlement. A suﬃcient condition is that transactions costs φj under collective
settlement are suﬃciently high relative to creditor bargaining power α. Of course, this begs the
question of whether delay could increase in practice. This question is addressed in section 4.C,
where we conduct simulations for plausible parameter values to show that collective settlement
may actually increase delay in practice.
194.B The Determinants of Delay: Comparative Dynamics
Since the propositions 3 and 4 yield closed-form expressions for expected delay, it is
straightforward to calculate the impact of changes in key parameters on these magnitude. The
following proposition summarizes the results of such an exercise:
Proposition 6 (Impact on Delay). Consider a subgame i with positive expected delay in either
settlement process.
(a) A rise in creditor bargaining power α increases delay under individual settlement, and has
no eﬀect under collective settlement;
(b) A rise in current transactions costs (a fall in θi) increases delay under both processes;
(c) A rise in future transactions costs reduces delay under both processes;
(d) A rise in the discount rate r reduces delay under both processes; and,
(e) A rise in the sovereign’s payoﬀ V from entering world capital markets has no eﬀect under
either process.
(f) A rise in the number of creditors N increases delay under both individual settlement and
collective action processes.
Proof. Parts (a) through (d) follow immediately from (8) for i > 1, and from (17) for i ≥ N−M.
Part (e) is immediate since delay expressions are independent of V . Part (f) is obvious.
Consider part (a). The strategic holdup motive for delay is increased with a rise in
creditor bargaining power. It is important to stress that this is not due to the fact that credi-
tors receive a greater share α of available surplus, because such a change aﬀects all payoﬀs in
the same proportion. The reason for increased delay, is that the undiscounted bargaining pie,
(1 − α)
i−1 V , increases proportionately more as i falls. Such a change has no impact under
collective settlement, as the strategic holdup motive is absent there. Under collective settle-
ment, all payoﬀs are proportional to α: Those who join the collective receive the undiscounted
payoﬀ (α/N)V θj and those who do not get (α/N)V . A rise in creditor bargaining power has
no eﬀect on relative payoﬀs and hence no eﬀect on delay under this regime.
20A rise in the transactions cost of bargaining in any given Si clearly leads to a fall in ui
relative to all other payoﬀs, and hence leads to increased delay going forward. This explains
(b). For (c), note that a rise in transactions cost in some future settlement stage raises the
relative payoﬀ in Si and therefore decreases delay. In part (d), a rise in the discount rate makes
all future payoﬀs less valuable relative to the current payoﬀ, and so reduces delay. Finally, it
is interesting to note that by (e) the changes in the size of V do not aﬀect the incentive to
delay under either process, because all payoﬀs are impacted proportionately the same way by
such changes. Interestingly, the model predicts that country size does not aﬀect the expected
duration of settlement, regardless of the process.
4.C Quantitative Results
In the previous section we showed that moving from an individual to a collective process
can increase the delay before agreement is reached. Here, we ask whether this occurs for
reasonable values for the level of bargaining power α, the number of creditors N, and the
parameters governing both the total cost of bargaining, as well its distribution across creditors.
The discussion of our calibration is necessarily brief. However, since all of these parameters
are non-standard, we present a more detailed discussion in the ancillary appendix.
We calibrate bargaining power to the observed ‘holdout premium’: the return received
by holdout creditors relative to that received by early-settling creditors. There is little available
data on holdout premia in sovereign debt restructurings. Singh (2003) cites claims that
holdout creditors received three times the return of regular creditors in restructurings of illiquid
sovereign debts that proceed to court action, but does not provide any documentation. For
cases involving liquid sovereign debts, Singh reports returns in excess of 100% per year for a
sample of only four defaults. Evidence from larger samples can be found in corporate debt
restructurings. Fridson and Gao (2002) ﬁnd holdout premia of 11% in a study of 115 U.S.
corporate debt restructurings from 1992 to 2000, down from the 30% estimates of Altman
and Eberhart (1994) based on 202 restructurings from 1980-1992. As the incentive to
holdout is determined by the expected return to doing so, and since Singh’s estimates need
not be representative of those expectations, we place more weight on the returns to corporate
debt restructuring and calibrate α to holdout premia of 10%, while also experimenting with
21premia of both 20% and 30%.12
The incentive to free ride depends on the size of negotiation costs, the extent to which
they are compensated by the debtor, and their allocation across creditors. We calibrate these
aspects using data from a range of sources. While some costs, like legal fees and printing
expenses, are easy to verify and share between creditors, others are not. Holley (1987)
documents that there is typically a lead creditor who bears both the mundane costs of travel,
arranging presentations, document preparation, and arranging signatures, as well as the more
substantial costs of reconciling the claims of all creditors and the sovereign, and establishing
criteria for the inclusion of loans within a restructuring deal. The latter can be very large
in restructurings where debt monitoring has been poor (e.g. Mexico: Milojevic 1985), the
sovereign’s debts are numerous and complicated (e.g. Mexico: Holley 1987, Kraft 1984;
Argentina and Brazil: Reiffel 2003), or when the sovereign assumes responsibility for foreign
debts owed by numerous private creditors within the country (e.g. Venezuela: Holley 1987).
An indication of the share of costs borne by the lead creditor can be obtained from their share
of syndicated bank loan fees, which McDonald 1982 shows average 75% rising substantially
for more complicated loans.
To calibrate the level of costs, we examine domestic corporate debt restructuring oper-
ations which are often cited as a model for reforms of the sovereign debt restructuring process
and thus might represent a lower bound. The direct costs of corporate debt restructuring
have been found to vary from as little as 0.3% of the total assets of the ﬁrm, when debts are
restructured privately, to between 3 and 4.5% of assets when debts are restructured through
bankruptcy, and to between 7.5 and 9.8% when ﬁrms are liquidated (Wruck 1990). As an
indicator of total costs, professional fees in corporate bankruptcy proceedings typically amount
to between 40% and 65% of total costs (Lopucki and Doherty 2004). In a sovereign con-
text, professional fees at the start of the 1980s debt crisis typically ranged from 1.5% to 3.5%
of the value of the restructured debt, falling to between 0.5% to 1% by the middle of the crisis,
perhaps reﬂecting the fact that the debts had been reconciled and veriﬁed in earlier rounds
(Institute of International Finance 2001). No fees were paid to creditor groups that
were not recognized by the sovereign, to any creditor if the sovereign rejected the proposed
12The resulting values for α are tabulated in the ancillary appendix.
22restructuring (e.g. Peru between 1985 and 1996), in cases that involved litigation,13 or even in
many successful restructuring operations (e.g. restructurings under the Brady Plan: Reiffel
2003). Gelpern and Gulati (2009) report that in several recent bond issues with collective
action clauses the sovereign is not required to reimburse expenses or professional fees. Cumu-
lating across multiple, often unsuccessful, rounds of negotiations, it appears plausible that the
total costs of a sovereign debt restructuring exceed those from a corporate restructuring by a
factor of two or more, of which only a modest fraction was compensated by the sovereign. To
capture the wide range in uncompensated costs caused by the varying complexity of a country’s
portfolio of defaulted debt, we present results for two polar cases. In a simple restructuring,
we set total costs to 1% of the value of the restructured debt, of which 75% falls on the lead
creditors in a collective action process, while in a complicated restructuring total costs are set
to 3.5%, of which 90% falls upon the lead creditor. We view these estimates of total costs as
conservative. For the individual settlement process, where the costs of reconciling and verifying
multiple creditor claims do not apply, we assume that all creditors bear the same proportional
cost of negotiation.
The number of creditors N is a diﬃcult parameter to calibrate, as there is considerable
variance in the number and size of creditors across, as well as within, restructurings. This is
further complicated since creditors frequently combine into representative groups suggesting
that it is more appropriate to think of N as the number of creditor groups, rather than number
of creditors per se. We calibrate N to capture the incentive of creditors to free ride on the
eﬀorts of the lead creditor, and of the collective more generally. An analysis of 84 bank and
bondholder representative committees that operated between 1976 and 2000 yields a mean
and median committee size of eleven.14 For the subset of these groups for which data are
available, one member typically acted as the lead creditor, with the committee as a whole
holding between one quarter and one third of the outstanding debt (Reed 1987). Under the
assumption that lead creditors held larger than average shares within the committee, these
numbers suggest that lead creditors held between 5 and 10 per-cent of the outstanding debt.
13That is, beyond court awarded costs. Lopucki and Doherty (2004) note that in corporate restructuring
cases, judges frequently deny some expense claims, although for typically small amounts.
14We thank Christoph Trebesch for sharing his data on creditor committees (Trebesch 2008).
23Hence, we calibrate N to 15 so that one creditor holds just less than 7% of the debt, while also
experimenting with N as low as 10 and as high as 20. The collective action threshold is set to
75% as in most recent collective action clauses (Gelpern and Gulati 2009). The number of
creditors is held constant following the introduction of a collective action mechanism. This is
not an unreasonable assumption for debts which are illiquid, which describes almost all debts
restructured in the 1980s, and all but a modest number of emerging market debts today.15
Table 1 reports delays under an individual settlement process as a function of the
number of creditors, and for three values of the holdout premium. The Table shows that,
for our baseline case of a 10% holdout premium and 15 creditors, the model produces an
average delay of 6.1 years which is almost exactly the median delay reported by Benjamin
and Wright (2002). With 10 creditors, the average delay produced by the model ranged
from 4 to 12 years, while with 20 creditors it ranged from 8 to 23 years, as holdout premia
were increased from 10% to 30%. Overall, these numbers bracket the median (6) and mean
(7.4) delay found in the modern data by Benjamin and Wright (2009), and lie within the
range of delays reported by those authors (the maximum delay in their sample was 24 years).
Table 1 also reports the percentage increase in delay from moving to a collective action
process, as a function of the number of creditors and the holdout premium for both simple and
complicated restructurings. As shown in the Table, for our benchmark case and a complicated
restructuring, the adoption of a collective action process results in a more than doubling of
delay. As the number of creditors falls, the lead creditors’ holdings rise and they internalize
more of the costs of bargaining, so that delays under a collective action process fall. However,
they always remain larger than under an individual settlement process with a holdout premium
of 10%. For a 20% holdout premia, the adoption of a collective action process can reduce
delays by 20% or more. By contrast, in a simple debt restructuring operation, the adoption of
a collective action process always reduces delays substantially: As shown in the Table, looking
across all parameter values, the reduction in delay always exceeds 60%.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that for a range of plausible parameter values, the model with
individual settlement is able to produce delays in line with those observed with the data.
For complicated restructuring operations, we ﬁnd that the adoption of a collective action
15In the working paper version, we discuss one method for endogenizing N.
24process more than doubles delay for our benchmark calibration, and always increases delay
when lead creditor holdings are small (N = 20), or the expected holdout premium is 10%. For
those restructuring operations which are relatively straightforward, the adoption of a collective
action process always reduces delay by more than half.
Table 1: Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Holdout Number of Creditors (N)
Premium 10 15 20
Delay with Individual Settlement (Years)
10% 4.1 6.1 8.1
20% 8.0 11.9 15.9
30% 11.7 17.5 23.3
Increase in Delay from Collective Action (%)
Complicated Restructuring
10% 73 133 236
20% -12 19 72
30% -40 -19 17
Simple Restructuring
10% -67 -64 -62
20% -83 -81 -80
30% -89 -87 -87
5 Robustness and Extensions
In this section we brieﬂy sketch the result of modifying the model to include asymmetric
creditors, diﬀerent bargaining protocols, and initial oﬀers by the sovereign using a series of
simple examples. A more complete treatment, including proofs, is available in the ancillary
appendix.
255.A Diﬀerent Bargaining Protocols
Endogenous Exit From Bargaining
Our bargaining game assumes that once begun, neither the creditor nor the debtor can
exit bargaining prior to agreement. This considerably simpliﬁes the analysis by making the
bargaining and timing stages separable so that the full model can be solved easily by iterating
between these stages. In practice, of course, both creditor and sovereign could walk away from
bargaining at any point while retaining the option to resume bargaining at a later date. We
show in the ancillary appendix that adding the option to terminate bargaining without an
agreement has no eﬀect on equilibrium outcomes. The intuition for this equivalence is quite
straightforward: rejection of an oﬀer leads to a (possibly small) socially costly delay so that
the parties are better oﬀ coming to an agreement without exit. As a consequence, the option
to walk away has no value in equilibrium and has no eﬀect on equilibrium outcomes (see also
the discussion in Sutton 1986).
The Debtor’s Option to Repay in Full
In the basic model, players’ payoﬀs were assumed to be independent of the face value of
the debt, which we denote by b. In practice, this may not be the case for a number of reasons.
One is that the sovereign always has the option to settle for the full outstanding debt and may
sometimes wish to do so. Here, we examine this possibility.
In many contexts, the addition of an outside option has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on bargaining
outcomes (e.g. Shaked 1994). However, in the ancillary appendix we prove that, in our
framework, adding the debtors outside option to repay to our extensive form bargaining game
serves only to cap payments to the creditor at b, so that ui = δi−1 min{αvi−1,b}θi. If αV < b,
it is cheaper for the sovereign to bargain with every creditor and the analysis is unaltered. If
αV > b, it is cheaper for the sovereign to at least pay the last creditor the face value b. In
general we show that early creditors will bargain and receive a haircut, while later creditors will
be repaid the full face value b. By capping payments to later settling creditors, the presence
of this outside option can decrease delays in restructuring.
265.B Asymmetric Creditors
Bargaining Abilities
Creditors may diﬀer in their ability to bargain with the sovereign in many ways: some
may have greater bargaining power, while others may ﬁnd bargaining less costly. For example,
vulture creditors, who specialize in bringing suit against a country in default, may enjoy greater
bargaining power because of their experience in litigation, but may incur greater bargaining
costs because they maintain a large legal staﬀ. In this subsection, we discuss an extension that
allows for these asymmetries, and ask whether the model supports the conventional wisdom
that the presence of vulture creditors increases delay.
Consider an example in which there is one vulture creditor, denoted by an asterisk
superscript, and a normal creditor, with no superscript. Bargaining occurs according to our
stochastic variant on Rubinstein’s game, with the vulture creditor making oﬀers with proba-
bility α∗ > α to capture the vultures presumed superior bargaining abilities. The vulture’s
transactions cost parameter θ
∗ may be either larger or smaller than that of the normal cred-
itor, θ. As above, we justify our focus on mixed strategy equilibria as the result of either
small amounts of uncertainty regarding each other’s payoﬀs (as in Harsanyi 1973) or the
absence of social norms for coordination due to the relative rarity of sovereign default and the
anonymity of many creditors.
In the ancillary appendix we show that, in the unique mixed strategy equilibrium, the
normal creditor is likely to engage before the vulture, while average delay is larger than with
two normal creditors independent of the vultures bargaining costs. These results are intuitive:
even though high bargaining costs could leave the vulture with a smaller absolute payoﬀ than
the normal creditor from going last, the relative gain to the vulture creditor from delay is
greater due to greater bargaining power and is unaﬀected by bargaining costs. In the ancillary
appendix we show that these results generalize to a world with many vulture and many normal
creditors.
Discount Rates
Diﬀerences in discount rates across creditors are straightforward to analyze in our frame-
work, and the result is consistent with the 1980s empirical observation that the most impatient
27creditors (that is, the least liquid banks) settled faster than other creditors. This is the result of
two reinforcing eﬀects in the model: for given bargaining payoﬀs a less patient creditor chooses
to enter bargaining more quickly, while at the same time a less patient creditor extracts smaller
amounts in bargaining which further reduces the incentive to holdout. Holding constant the
payoﬀ from bargaining, we can show that the equilibrium delay is determined by the average
level of impatience across creditors. The ancillary appendix proves this result for the case with
many identical patient, and many identical impatient, creditors.
Creditor Holdings
In contrast to our basic model, where creditors are identical in all respects, creditor
holdings are, in practice, quite heterogeneous. How does this aﬀect delay? Given that the
sovereign can end negotiations by repaying in full, the natural bargaining protocol for analyzing
this case is that of ‘bargaining with outside options’ discussed in Section above.
Consider a two creditor example, ﬁrst with an individual settlement process, and let
creditors’ respective bondholdings be b for small, and B for large holdings, with b < B.
Obviously, if b ≤ α(1 − α)V , the sovereign pays-oﬀ the small creditor and the game ends
without delay, while if αV < b, the sovereign will never settle-in-full with either creditor and
results are the same as for our basic model. In the intermediate case α(1 − α)V < b < αV < B
the sovereign will want to pay the small creditor in full only if it is last to bargain, and will
never wish to pay the large creditor in full. This case generates delay on average, although
less than with two symmetric creditors because the cap on the small creditors payoﬀ from
holding out reduces its incentive to do so. In addition, the large creditor bargains over a large
pie if they engage ﬁrst, increasing their incentive to engage quickly. To summarize, suppose
we start with two creditors with symmetric holdings that are large enough that the sovereign
never wants to pay in full. As heterogeneity of holdings increases, holding total debt constant,
delay is initially unaﬀected, begins to decline as the sovereign prefers to pay oﬀ a small holdout
creditor, and eventually disappears when the sovereign ﬁnds it always proﬁtable to pay the
small creditor in full.
Now consider the same example but under a collective action mechanism with constant
repayment per bond (as in practice). In this case, if the sovereign repays any creditor in full,
28it must pay all in full. Suppose that bargaining costs are ﬁxed as a proportion of the total
repayment and are thus a greater proportion of a small creditor’s settlement. This reduces the
small creditors incentive to engage quickly. However, as the total settlement is capped, costs
are now a smaller proportion of the large creditors settlement, increasing their incentive to
settle quickly. Both creditors adjust their strategies in response to the changing incentives of
the other creditor and, strikingly, both eﬀects exactly oﬀset and the amount of delay observed
under a collective action clause is unchanged.
This implies that, if we compare restructurings that are identical except for diﬀerent
degrees of asymmetry in bondholdings by creditors, the gains from moving to a collective
action clause will be lowest (or most negative) for the restructuring with the most asymmetric
bondholdings.
5.C Initial Settlement Oﬀers by the Sovereign
In the basic model, the sovereign makes oﬀers only through bargaining, which itself is
initiated by creditors. This is designed to reﬂect the relatively anonymous nature of many
sovereign bond investments, where, in practice, the sovereign cannot easily initiate settlement
negotiations.16 Nonetheless, it is reasonable to think that the sovereign is able to announce
an initial settlement oﬀer. Here, we consider the eﬀect of adding an initial stage where the
sovereign makes an oﬀer that each creditor can accept or reject.
We show that an initial payout oﬀer will not generally eliminate delay: The only way
to do so, is for the payout to exceed that which each creditor otherwise obtains. Consider
individual settlement. Since the last creditor to bargain extracts αV , to eliminate delay each
creditor must be oﬀered at least this amount, which makes for a total bill of NαV . If Nα > 1,
then this exceeds the entire proceeds from re-entering world capital markets.
Even if Nα < 1, it may not be optimal to eliminate delay: the optimal oﬀer must
trade oﬀ the decline in delay against the higher payments to early settling creditors. In the
ancillary appendix section we solve for the optimal oﬀer analytically with two creditors. We
ﬁnd that when bargaining power α is below some cutoﬀ, the sovereign ﬁnds it optimal to
16Indeed, in some cases, sovereigns have had to hire intermediaries to track down and contact creditors. See,
for example, the discussion of Ukraine’s 2000 restructuring in IMF (2000).
29eliminate delay by paying out creditors, whereas if bargaining power is above another cutoﬀ,
the sovereign prefers to make no oﬀer at all. In between, a positive initial oﬀer serves to reduce,
but not eliminate, delay.
6 Concluding Comments
In this paper we developed a model of negotiation in a weak contractual environment
that reﬂects the key features of the sovereign debt renegotiation process. The model generates
delay in equilibrium as a result of two collective action problems: a ‘strategic holdup’ eﬀect,
where each creditor delays settlement with the sovereign in order to exploit bilateral bargaining
power later; and, a ‘free rider’ eﬀect in which creditors delay settlement to avoid sharing in
negotiation costs. In our most striking result, we show that the introduction of a collective
action mechanism can increase delay, as the imposition of common settlement terms across
creditors intensiﬁes the incentive for creditors to free ride. When the model is calibrated to
the range of negotiation costs observed in practice, we ﬁnd that free riding is quantitatively
relevant, with the introduction of a collective action mechanism more than doubling delay in
complicated and costly restructuring operations. For simpler restructuring operations, where
costs are low, we ﬁnd that collective mechanisms reduce delay by more than 60%.
We conclude with three suggestions for future work. First, we consider a sovereign that
is already in default, and abstract from the sovereign’s decision to borrow and default in the ﬁrst
instance. As a result, we cannot draw normative conclusions for the introduction of collective
action mechanisms, unlike Pitchford and Wright (2007) who use numerical methods to
study the welfare eﬀect of collective action mechanisms in a related environment. Second, we
consider a case in which the ability to retrade sovereign debts in secondary markets is limited,
so that creditor numbers and holdings of debt cannot adjust following a change in restructuring
institutions. While this is a reasonable description of almost all sovereign debt markets in the
1980s, and of many today, for some countries debt liquidity has increased substantially. For
some work on the eﬀect of secondary markets for sovereign debt see Broner, Martin and
Ventura (2009). Third, in focusing on collective action problems among creditors, we have
entirely abstracted from collective action problems within the debtor country. Some progress
on this question has been made by Alesina and Drazen (1991).
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7.A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We will prove the result for the case where one creditor bargains for all N, since the
individual case is captured trivially by setting N = 1.
Let the set of subgame perfect (SGP) equilibrium payoﬀs for the sovereign be given by
Xj ≡ {xj : ∃ an SPE of Sj with payoﬀs (xj,zj)},
and the set of SGP equilibrium payoﬀs for the creditor by
Zj ≡ {zj : ∃ an SPE of Sj with payoﬀs (xj,zj)}.
Note that all subgames, prior to the realization of the identity of the proposer, are identical
and so possess the same set of SGP equilibrium values.
Suppose that the set of SPE values is non-empty, which mean there exists a (non-trivial)
sup and an inf for each set. Thus, the sovereign can do no better than xj ≡ supXj and no worse
than xj = inf Xj. Similarly, the creditor can do no better than zj = supZj and no worse than
zj = inf Zj. Consider a subgame of Sj that begins after nature has determined that the creditor
makes the oﬀer. Then since the sovereign will reject all oﬀers less than e−r∆xj, the worst payoﬀ





Similarly, as the sovereign would accept any oﬀer greater than e−r∆xj, the best it could get





a subgame of Sj that begins after nature has determined that the sovereign makes the oﬀer.
Using the same reasoning, the creditor will reject any oﬀer less than e−r∆zj which implies the
sovereign’s payoﬀ is no greater than Vj−1 − Ne−r∆zj. Similarly, the creditor will accept any
oﬀer greater than e−r∆zj which implies the sovereign’s payoﬀ is no less than Vj−1 − Ne−r∆zj.





+ (1 − α)e−r∆zj. That is, the best the creditor can do at this
point in Sj is the probability-weighted sum of the best it can do if it has the oﬀer (i.e.
the sovereign is pinned down to e−r∆xj, so the creditor gets Vj−1 − e−r∆xj) and the best














. Solving these equations we ﬁnd zj = zj =
(α/N)Vj−1 and xj = xj = (1 − α)Vj−1. This establishes uniqueness of the SGP equilibrium
values.
To complete the proof, we now exhibit SGP equilibrium strategies that attain these val-
ues. The strategies take the following form: The creditor always proposes a split in which they
receive
 
1 − e−r∆ (1 − α)

Vj−1/N, accepts any proposal greater than or equal to e−r∆αVj−1/N;
the sovereign always proposes a split in which the creditor receives e−r∆αVj−1/N and accepts
any proposal in which it receives greater than or equal to e−r∆ (1 − α)Vj−1. Suppose nature
chooses the sovereign to make the oﬀer. The creditor will only accept an oﬀer if it is at least
as large as e−r∆αVj−1/N, since rejection leads to Sj with the payoﬀ e−r∆αVj−1/N. Hence,
this acceptance rule constitutes a best response by the creditor. Further, the sovereign pro-
31poses the share e−r∆αVj−1/N for the creditor (which the creditor immediately accepts). To





e−r∆ (1 − α)Vj−1 and which is only attainable if the sovereign proposes e−r∆αVj−1/N (which
we have argued the creditor always accepts). Analogous reasoning holds if nature chooses the
creditor to make the oﬀer.
7.B Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First note that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. If there
did, then any creditor could proﬁtably deviate by delaying entry into the settlement process
by any ε > 0.
To calculate the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for Ti, i > 1, note that players
are indiﬀerent between playing the mixed strategy and any pure strategy in its support. Let
all other’s play according to Fi (t − ti), and consider the pure strategy in which the creditor
enters T units of time after ti—which we normalize to 0 for convenience—provided no other
player has entered by this time, and enters immediately if another has entered. The creditor
receives e−rTui with probability [1−Fi(T)]i−1, which is the probability no other creditor enters
the settlement process before T. If one of the other i − 1 creditors does enter before T, the
creditor gets Ui−1. The probability that this occurs is governed by the ﬁrst order statistic for
the randomized entry of the i − 1 other creditors, each of whom play according to Fi, which








The creditor is indiﬀerent between entering immediately and getting ui, and playing the pure







−rt(i − 1)fi(t)[1 − Fi(t)]
i−2dt (21)
Since (21) is true for all T, the derivative of the RHS with respect to T is zero, i.e.
−ruie
−rT[1 − Fi(T)]
i−1 − [ui − Ui−1]e
−rTfi(T)(i − 1)[1 − Fi(T)]
i−2 = 0. (22)
Re-arranging and cancelling terms yields the diﬀerential equation
−dlog(1 − Fi)/dT = rui/(i − 1)(Ui−1 − ui), (23)
with initial condition Fi(0) = 0, which has solution
F
∗




(i − 1)[Ui−1 − ui]
. (25)
32Since the creditor is indiﬀerent between playing F ∗
i and any pure strategy, such as
entering immediately in Ti, the expected payoﬀ of each creditor at the start of Ti is ui =
Ui. βi is the expected value of ert, conditional on entry by the ﬁrst creditor. Thus, it is
calculated using the density for the minimum entry time of i random variables drawn from the
equilibrium density F ∗
i , which we denote gi(t) ≡ if∗
i (t)[1 − F ∗
i (t)]i−1, as βi =
R ∞
0 ertgi(t)dt =
iui/((i − 1)Ui−1 + ui). Finally, note that by the well known properties of the exponential
distribution E [ti − ti−1] = [iλi]−1 = (i − 1)[Ui−1 − ui]/irui.
7.C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proof is by induction. Consider the settlement stage in subgame 1. By Lemma
1, as the sovereign receives V from concluding the bargain, the creditor expects to receive
u1 = αV,and the sovereign v1 = (1 − α)V . Moving backwards to the timing stage, by Lemma
2, the creditor enters immediately so that delay is 0, and β1 = 1, which yields V1 = (1 − α)V.
Now suppose that the payoﬀ to the sovereign from moving to the start of subgame i−1 is
given by Vi−1 = δi−1 (1 − α)
i−1 V, while the payoﬀ to a creditor is Ui−1 = δi−2α(1 − α)
i−2 V θi−1.
Consider the settlement stage at i. By Lemma 1, the creditor that has entered the settlement
stage expects to receive ui = αVi−1 = δi−1α(1 − α)
i−1 V θi, while the sovereign expects to
receive vi = (1 − α)Vi−1 = δi−1 (1 − α)
i V. Under our assumption on θi and θi−1, we can apply
Lemma 2, which gives us that, in timing stage n, the creditors play the symmetric mixed
strategies given by Fi = 1 − exp{−λit} where on substitution of payoﬀs the hazard rate is
λi =
rβi−1 (1 − α)θi
(i − 1)

θi−1 − βi−1 (1 − α)θi
,
implying that the expected duration of the stage is







βi−1θi−1 − (1 − α)θi
(1 − α)θi
,
and the expected discount factor is βi = iβi−1 (1 − α)θi

(i − 1)θi−1 + βi−1 (1 − α)θi
−1. Sub-
stituting the expression for βi−1 from (11) above yields









Substituting this in the expression for expected delay, we obtain







−k θi−k − iθi
#
337.D Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The proof is by induction. Consider stage 1 and assume that N − M > 1. Then the
settlement stage S1 yields payoﬀs u1 = αV/N to the creditor. As the sovereign regains access
to capital markets once it has settled with N − M creditors, its payoﬀ remains at v1 = V. As
there is only one creditor, there is no delay in the timing stage T1, so that β1 = 1, and V1 = V.
Now suppose the above results hold for stage i−1, and consider stage i. To begin, assume
that i < N −M. Then settlement stage Si yields payoﬀs ui = αV/N to the creditor, while the
sovereign continues to enjoy vi = V. By Lemma 2 there is no delay, βi = 1, Ui = ui−1, and
Vi = V. Instead, suppose i = N −M > i−1. Then the settlement stage Si is a bargaining stage
and by Lemma 1 the creditor receives the payoﬀ ui = αV/Nθi, while the sovereign receives
vi = (1 − α)V. By Lemma 2 all i creditors randomize according to cdf Fi = 1 − exp{−λit}
where, after substitution, the hazard rate is λi = rθi/(i − 1)(1 − θi), the expected duration
of the stage is E [ti − ti−1] = [iλi]
−1 1 = (i − 1)(1 − θi)/irθi, and the expected discount factor
is βi = iθi [(i − 1) + θi]
−1. Thus Ui = ui and Vi = βivi = δivi.
Finally, suppose i−1 ≥ N −M, and assume that the above formulae hold for i−1. We
show that they hold for i. In this case, the settlement stage Si yields the creditor the payoﬀ
ui = δi−1α(V/N)θi, while the sovereign receives vi = δi−1 (1 − α)V. By Lemma 2 all i creditors
randomize according to cdf Fi = 1 − exp{−λit} where after substitution the hazard rate is




, the expected duration of the stage is







βi−1θi−1 − (1 − α)θi
(1 − α)θi
,
and the expected discount factor is βi = iβi−1θi

(i − 1)θi−1 + βi−1θi
−1. Using the expression
for βi−1 above we ﬁnd
βi = iθi






Substituting βi−1 into the expression for expected delay we ﬁnd




N − M +
Xi−1
k=N−(M−1) θk − (i − 1)(1 − α)θi

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